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Abstract
The Orion spacecraft will replace the Space Shuttle Orbiter for American and international partner access to
the International Space Station by 2015 and, afterwards, for access to the moon for initial sorties and later for
extended outpost visits as part of the Constellation Exploration Initiative. This work describes some of the efforts
being undertaken to ensure that the Constellation Program, Orion Crew Exploration Vehicle design will meet or
exceed the stringent micrometeoroid and orbital debris (MMOD) requirements set out by NASA when exposed to
the environments encountered with these missions. This paper will provide a brief overview of the approaches
being used to provide MMOD protection to the Orion vehicle and to assess the spacecraft for compliance to the
Constellation Program’s MMOD requirements.
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1. I ntroduction
The Orion vehicle is being assessed for micrometeoroid and orbital debris (MMOD) risk for 210
day missions to the International Space Station (ISS), short duration missions to the moon (Lunar
Sortie) and long duration (210 day) missions to the moon (Lunar Outpost) to ensure compliance with
the Constellation Program’s MMOD requirements. The assessed vehicle consists of a Crew Module
(CM) and a Service Module (SM) in a configuration that is similar to the architecture of the Apollo
spacecraft. The SM provides propulsion capabilities as well as other support utilities such as, water,
compressed gases, active thermal control and power to the CM. The CM houses the crew and provides
the thermal protection system (TPS) that is necessary for Earth entry. The CM separates from the SM
prior to Earth re-entry and lands using parachutes.
NASA’s Bumper-II software and the latest micrometeoroid and orbital debris environments are
being used to assess the Orion vehicle for MMOD risk with the three mission types. The assessed risk
levels are then checked against the requirements to ensure compliance. Lockheed Martin developed pre
and post processing macros and spreadsheets are used to streamline and reduce the chance for human
error with Bumper-II data input and output. A detailed Orion vehicle analysis finite element surface
model is produced directly from the Orion computer aided design (CAD) model and is effectively
“flown” thru the MMOD environments using the Bumper-II assessment software.
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Nomenclature
BH w Brinell Hardness of Rear Wall (BHN)
BH AL Brinell Hardness of Aluminum (BHN)
c s,w	 Sound Speed of Rear Wall (km/s)
c s,AL Sound Speed of Aluminum (km/s)
Pb	 Density of Bumper (g/cm2)
Pw	 Density of Rear Wall (g/cm2)
PAL	 Density of Aluminum (g/cm2)
6w	 Yield Strength of Rear Wall (ksi)
6AL	 Yield Strength of Aluminum (ksi)
tb	Bumper Thickness (cm)
tw 	Rear Wall Thickness (cm)
tb.eq	 Bumper Equivalent Thickness (cm)
tw,eq	 Rear Equivalent Wall Thickness (cm)
2. Orion MMOD Risk Analysis Tools
2.1 Bumper-II Assessment Software
NASA’s standard MMOD assessment software, BUMPER-II, is used to assess the Orion spacecraft
for MMOD loss of crew (LOC) and loss of mission (LOM) risk levels. BUMPER-II has a long track
record of use on various NASA manned programs, such as on mission analysis for the Space Shuttle
and ISS. NASA’s latest anisotropic meteoroid and orbital debris environments are used with the
BUMPER-II software to assess the micrometeoroid and orbital debris impact damage that exceeds
failure criteria limits. Input and output data are pre- and post-processed using EXCEL spreadsheets and
macros. Bumper-II software refinements have been made in order to reduce assessment times, eliminate
unnecessary calculations and incorporate new and refined ballistic limit equations (BLEs). With respect
to assessment time refinements, the processing time for the complete set of runs making up an ISS
mission assessment has recently been reduced from over 13 hours to approximately 6.5 hours even
though the number of separate runs increased from 36 to 48. Further modifications have been made to
BUMPER-II by NASA to enable use of the new Meteoroid Engineering Model (MEM) input files
which are discussed in Section 3. All modifications to BUMPER-II are reviewed and approved through
an Orion Bumper-II Change Control Board (CCB).
2.2 Pre-Processing Tools
In order to speed analysis run preparations while reducing the chance of input error, Excel macros
are used to create script files that contain the analysis response inputs for BUMPER-II. The properties
for each of the vehicle model’s property identifier (PID) regions are maintained in Excel spreadsheets.
The Excel macros convert the data into the script file format that Bumper-II requires. This approach
provides the response file inputs in the required cryptic format needed by Bumper-II while enabling
easy review and report table generation using Excel worksheets. The Excel PID spreadsheets are also
configured to provide ease of property modifications as required for trade study and design
optimization sensitivity assessments.
Similarly, the shield script files are created using a script file creator that automatically establishes
the element ranges needed for results reporting based on the model’s PIDs. With the large number of
PIDs and elements associated with the Orion model this saves much labor and reduces the chance of
human error.
2.3 Post-Processing Tools
Enormous amounts of data are created and post-processed while assessing the Orion missions for
MMOD risk and it is common to run hundreds of complete sets of mission runs for sensitivity studies.
Therefore, automation is necessary for post-processing of the Bumper-II output data. And, as with pre-
processing, automation reduces the chance of error. The output macro combines the output sum file
results for 34 separate Bumper-II runs in assessing complete lunar missions. ISS missions require 48
separate runs. Additionally, the output macro accounts for component and system redundancies in
rolling up overall mission LOC and LOM risk.
3. MMOD Environments
Orion MMOD analyses use ORDEM2000 as the orbital debris environment generator and
MEMCxP/LunarMEM as the meteoroid environment generator. The ORDEM2000 environment as
implemented by the NASA/JSC orbital debris program office is used for all low earth orbit (LEO)
mission phases [1]. The MEMCxP v2.0 meteoroid environment for Earth orbital spacecraft as
developed by the NASA/MSFC Meteoroid Environment Office (MEO) is used for all meteoroid
analyses up to the lunar sphere of influence (66,000 km to the moon). The LunarMEM v2.0 as
developed by the NASA/MSFC MEO is used for lunar orbital spacecraft within the lunar sphere of
influence.
The MEM environments account for the directionality of the helion, anti-helion, and the north and
south apex and toroidal micrometeoroid flux populations [2]. Additionally, based on radar data, the
average of the velocity distribution is higher than that of the older SSP-30425 environment. The
average velocity increased from 19 km/s to approximately 24 km/s. With MEM, the micrometeoroid
density is assumed to be 1.0 gm/cm 3 .
4. MMOD Vehicle Model
4.1 Orion Vehicle Model
Micrometeoroid and orbital debris analysis, using the BUMPER-II code, uses detailed finite
element models (FEM) for the spacecraft that are produced using the I-DEAS ® CAD System. The
FEM is created starting from CAD 3D models that are translated into I-DEAS from Pro-Engineer®
Wildfire 3 ®
 vehicle models.
The BUMPER-II analysis code can only process surface models, thus all critical components inside
the vehicle are projected onto the outer mold line (OML) of the vehicle. These outer surfaces are
broken up into separate PID regions enabling assignment of specific wall and shield properties to the
PID regions in accordance with their corresponding vehicle design properties. Then the regions are
meshed using 2D surface elements. Figure 1 shows the most recent Orion MMOD analysis FEM. It is
made up of approximately 86000 elements and 480 unique PID regions.
Fig. 1. Orion MMOD Vehicle Model
4.2 Ray-Tracing Tool
A new tool being developed by the Lockheed Martin Orion MMOD analysis team leads to a more
refined modeling technique for creating the model PID regions and for defining their properties. The
tool is a ray tracing program written using the ProToolkit add-on in Pro Engineer, which allows the user
to generate C based macros. The ray tracing tool generates a ray based on the z-component of a user
selected coordinate system. The points of surface intersection are captured and the macro outputs
various parameters used in the MMOD analysis cycle. Post processing routines then transform the data
into a more readable format.
Figures 2 and 3 show the ray tracing tool being applied for a shot line through the underside of the
forward region of the Service Module into a cold plate. At the first point of intersection with the shield,
an approximation of the turndown angle is applied and 25 additional rays are generated to approximate
spreading of a debris cloud. For each of these rays a complete layup is given for the shot line including
part name, material, thickness, standoff, and impact angle. This information is then used to more
accurately model the PID region. Work is continuing to improve modeling of the debris cloud’s
direction and spread.
Fig. 2. Shot line through the Avionics Ring into a Cold Plate
Fig. 3. Shot line after breakup of the particle. Twenty-five additional rays approximate the debris cone.
Traditionally, PIDs are defined using a fair amount of engineering judgment by the modeler.
Component profiles are projected out to the model surface and are given a conservative shot line layup.
The main advantage in using this tool is that it helps facilitate better understanding of the effects of
turndown and debris cloud. It also provides the modeler a more verifiable approach for approximating
PID regions. Development is continuing on this ray tracer tool.
5. Failure Criteria
A failure criterion is established for each component that is modeled and assessed as part of the
vehicle analysis. This criterion defines the degree of damage that when exceeded counts as a failure.
With the Orion spacecraft, the CM backshell thermal protection system (TPS) is the largest risk driver
and hence, the vehicle’s overall risk levels are quite sensitive to the backshell failure criterion. Failure
of the backshell TPS is counted when the level of damage to the TPS exceeds the limit determined by
reentry thermal analyses. A sizable effort is well underway to refine the failure criteria for the TPS.
This is an area that is getting a lot of attention for further MMOD and thermal (arc jet) testing and
analysis. Another major area of emphasis is the failure criteria of pressure vessels. An analysis and
testing program is underway to better define the failure criteria of metallic and composite overwrapped
pressure vessels.
An Excel spreadsheet is used to track and maintain failure criteria for all critical components and
systems. The spreadsheet also tracks the applicability of a given failure criteria to LOC and LOM for
each phase of a mission with the corresponding level of redundancy. For example, SM propellant tanks
fail via rupture when the failure threshold is exceeded so they are tracked as LOC for all phases for all
missions. For another example, with the lunar missions, when one of the two SM coolant loops is lost,
a LOM is applicable during all phases up to when mission objectives have been completed (prior to the
vehicles journey to reentry); however, a LOC is applicable only for the loss of both SM coolant loops
but in all mission phases.
6. Ballistic Limit Equations
One or more ballistic limit equations (BLEs) are associated with each PID region (shield/wall type).
The Bumper-II program uses the BLEs to determine the critical diameter that just exceeds the failure
criteria for each combination of impact velocity and obliquity. Initially, where BLEs were not already
available, they were adapted from existing “standard” forms using scaling factors and critical diameter
summing. Since that time they have been updated based on data from hypervelocity impact testing
performed by NASA and/or Lockheed Martin. Hydrocode analyses using Autodyn ® and CTH® have
been used to fine tune test plans and to supplement test results.
Beginning early in the program, existing, standard BLEs were adapted to provide approximate
performance modeling for unique Orion wall/shield configurations. Impact testing results were not yet
available due to the program just getting started, the evolving design and the time needed to set up test
facility subcontracts, produce test plans and procure test specimen. Therefore, initial BLEs needed to
be derived from existing standard equations. In general this consisted of applying scaling factors to
shield and wall material properties and thicknesses to model ballistic limit performance using the Single
Sheet Protection equation, the Aluminum Whipple Shield equations and the Stuffed Whipple Shield
equations [3] [4]. Where necessary to approximate the performance of supplemental shield layers
within a shield/wall stack, BLEs were configured to account for the overall performance by summing
the critical diameters of the subparts.
The models used to characterize performance of these three shield designs are all empirical, thus,
requiring extensive experimental validation of the fitted material parameters. The BLEs were generally
based on aluminum bumper and wall materials, so when the Orion design uses materials other than
aluminum, compensations must be made for the different material properties. As the critical mass (the
mass of the MMOD threat that fails the shield) has been found to be roughly proportional to the
thickness of the shield material, the approach used to generate the shield model for Orion is to
determine the equivalent aluminum thickness of the shield materials that compensates for the actual
material properties.
For the cases where a double-wall or a stuffed, double-wall shield design is used, the method for
scaling shield (bumper) materials to aluminum equivalent thicknesses, tb,eq, is
(1)
where ρAl is the density of the referenced material (6061-T6 aluminum at 2.71 g/cm 3 (0.098 lb/in3)), and
tb and Pb are the thickness and density of the actual Orion shield wall, respectively. It is also necessary
to scale the rear wall (critical component’s housing) as the rear walls are not generally constructed of
aluminum. The approach for scaling the thicknesses of metallic rear walls, tw,eq, is
(2)
where σAl is the yield strength of the reference material (6061-T6 aluminum at 35 ksi), and t w, ρw, and
σw are the as designed thickness, density, and yield stress of the rear wall, respectively. In both of these
cases, the scaling equations are derived directly from the existing BLEs as incorporated in BUMPER-II.
The final regions where scaling relations are necessary are the regions of monolithic metal. For
these regions the scaling determined from the monolithic BLE in BUMPER-II is
(3)
where BH and c s are the Brinell hardness and isentropic speed of sound, respectively.
As hypervelocity impact testing enabled replacement of the approximation BLEs with BLEs
developed for the Orion wall/shield designs, it was found that generally the scaling approaches used
with the standard BLEs were providing critical diameters that could be called rough at best. This
highlights the need for early testing, increased use of hydrocode modeling, and perhaps, the need for a
standard library of BLEs. In the case of Orion, the ballistic limit approximations that over performed
tended to counter the ones that underperformed such that the overall vehicle results were not severely
far removed from reality. And, the resulting error has generally been in the conservative direction due
to the tendency of the analyst to sway the approximation equations and input properties in that
direction.
The Orion MMOD LOC and LOM assessments are now based on BLEs that have been developed
or refined based on impact testing of the design configurations. Additional testing will provide
additional data points for further refinement of the Orion specific BLEs. Post critical design review
(CDR) testing will ensure that the final flight hardware design BLEs are verified.
7. Orion MMOD Requirements
Loss of crew (LOC) MMOD Systems Requirement Document (SRD) requirements were defined
for each of the Orion mission types at the beginning of the Orion program. The requirements have
evolved somewhat but the LOC requirement is 1 in 800 for ISS missions, 1 in 1000 for lunar sortie
missions and 1 in 500 for lunar outpost missions. In addition, loss of mission (LOM) and LOC flow
down requirement allocations for overall vehicle LOC and LOM reliability were recently defined for
the lunar sortie and ISS missions. The MMOD LOC allocations are 1 in 2400 for lunar sortie and 1 in
1200 for ISS missions. The LOM allocations are 1 in 1700 for lunar sortie and 1 in 160 for ISS
missions. Lunar outpost reliability LOC and LOM allocations have yet to be defined. The long delay in
receiving lunar sortie and ISS mission reliability allocations, and the continued lack of such allocations
for lunar outpost missions, proved the importance of having separately defined MMOD SRD
requirements for a program such as this.
8. Orion Design/Assessment Approach
Feedback is provided to the Orion design organization based on scrutiny of assessment results. By-
PID results are sorted by number of failures and failures/exposed area so that it can be determined
where additional protection is required and where protection mass can be reduced. Many factors
influence the determination of the proper balance of MMOD risk across the modules and component
areas. The MMOD Team works closely with the spacecraft designers, mass properties, and other
analysis disciplines to find this proper balance.
Additionally, the MMOD Team participates in and provides inputs on special trade studies that are
charged with determining the best design approach between various options that are under
consideration. Generally, the team assesses the impact of the various options on the MMOD risk levels
and provides feedback on each option’s impact on MMOD mass, cost and schedule. Various
sensitivities are also performed to assess design and operational variations enabling evolution to a
superior spacecraft configuration and mission approach.
9. I nnovation
A number of innovative design approaches have been used with the Orion vehicle in providing
MMOD protection. An example is in the use of Kevlar fabrics and open cell foam to act as a rear wall
or to supplemental rear wall protection for propellant tanks and other components on which they are
directly mounted. The Kevlar and foam protection is utilized behind Whipple bumpers or Stuffed
Whipple bumpers and fabric layers. In some cases Kevlar layers act wholly as the rear wall in insuring
that no surface damage is sustained by the protected component and in other cases Kevlar layers
supplement the protection that is inherent in the component’s outer wall. In both cases, the Kevlar
fabric layers are separated from the surface being protected or supplemented by a layer of open-cell
polyimide foam. Depending on the design intent, the Kevlar is used to either fully stop or greatly slow
the debris cloud constituents. Upon debris cloud impingement, the Kevlar stretches and deflects as the
foam layer locally compresses between the Kevlar and component wall. This design approach appears
to allow the Kevlar to build up membrane stresses in slowing or stopping penetration. The foam
thickness and compressive strength is selected to limit surface damage to the component while allowing
the impact momentum to be reacted by the protected component. Development testing has shown the
Kevlar and foam design to be very effective in limiting damage to the component being protected.
Other innovative design solutions include the use of multi-functional materials such as MMOD rear
walls that also perform as redundant reentry thermal barriers, or structural members, and using an
extension of the SM outer wall to protect the heat shield. Also, testing has shown that the use with
Orion of composite structural layers instead of titanium within the TPS reduces the likelihood of
penetration of the crew pressure wall located behind it.
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10. Orion MMOD Protection
The Orion MMOD protection has evolved to a configuration that meets the program requirements.
Figure 4 provides a vehicle layout showing locations of supplemental MMOD protection.
Fig. 4. Supplemental MMOD Protection Locations
Supplemental MMOD protection is added to the CM in a number of areas. An outer “bumper”
shroud is added around the outside of the Low Impact Docking System (LIDS) creating a Whipple
Shield for protection of its pressure wall. With ISS missions, additional MMOD fabrics are added
behind the LIDS bumper providing Stuffed Whipple Shield type protection. Inner housings are added
around star trackers and Reaction Control System (RCS) pods behind the TPS to provide thermal
redundancy after MMOD damage. TPS backshell tile and substrate thicknesses are adjusted to enable
meeting overall vehicle requirements. Also, to reduce the risk of the heat shield TPS material receiving
damage beyond allowable reentry depth limits, it is thickened in the shoulder region. This is the only
area of the heat shield that has some limited direct exposed to MMOD flux.
The SM also has supplemental MMOD protection. The forward segment of the SM is extended
over the CM’s heat shield to minimize direct exposure of the heat shield to MMOD flux. “Stuffed
Whipple fabrics” are added under this extension as well as under most of the rest of the SM’s outer wall
to protect the heat shield and other critical components such as tanks and cold plates from MMOD with
ISS missions. For lunar missions the blankets are left out since the Whipple Shield configuration is
adequate in the less severe lunar MMOD environment. The smaller diameter portion of the SM is
covered with Active Control System (ATCS) radiators. The coolant lines and manifolds that are
located inside of the radiator panel are thickened towards the outside for MMOD protection. The panel
itself helps to protect the radiator lines and manifolds as well as functioning as the “bumper” shield for
the main propulsion tanks and various other critical items located within that region of the SM. There
is a MMOD fabric wall protecting components within the forward portion of the SM that have credible
shot lines for damage from MMOD angling forward through the radiator panels. There is Whipple
shield protection added to the various utilities running within the umbilical and to critical solar array
actuators. Also, due to the criticality of protecting the large propulsion fuel tanks there is specialized
MMOD blankets and foam shielding that is used to directly protect critical surfaces from damage from
shot lines through the radiators and the SM’s aft closeout panel. The references in the text are missing.
You may want to add them in the text. I think there is a need for a reference on ORDEM just like there
is reference on MEM.
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Orion is the first man-rated reentry
vehicle designed to stringent MMOD
requirements for a variety of missions
• Missions to both the ISS and moon are considered against
requirements that address unique attributes of each mission
– Missions to asteroids, L2 and other locations are possible
• The MMOD protection is adaptable to a wide range of threat
fluxes due to the variety in mission types and durations
• The BumperII code is used to analyze over 500 shield
configurations of the Orion vehicle
• The analysis of the Orion vehicle uses the most recent Orbital
Debris Engineering Model (ORDEM2000) and the Meteoroid
Engineering Model (MEM CxP and Lunar MEM) to specify the
operational environments
• On-going test efforts are examining the failure mechanisms as
well as shield performance of the Orion vehicle
Unprecedented MMOD Design Influence
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Orion is designed to service the ISS
Up to 212 day missions to the International
Space Station – Orion serves as a crew
escape vehicle while it is docked
• Loss of Crew – includes damage to the
Orion vehicle that results in loss of life
either while in orbit or during reentry
– Crew safe haven is used to account
for crew safety from reentry failures
while Orion is docked to the ISS.
– Catastrophic damage such as rupture
of pressure vessels while docked or .
while in transit is counted as loss of
crew
• Loss of Mission – includes damage that
results in a mission abort or causes the
vehicle to unsafe to reenter
– Redundancy of critical components is
assessed
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Orion is designed to perform up to 225 day
lunar missions
Sortie missions provide 7 days in low .
lunar orbit and up to an additional 15
days in transit 	 .
Outpost missions provide up to 210 days
in low lunar orbit and up to an
additional 15 days in transit
• Loss of Crew – includes damage to the
Orion vehicle that results in loss of life
either while in space or during reentry
– All vehicle damage that results in
loss of life is counted
• Loss of Mission – includes damage that
results in a shortened mission or . .
prevents meeting science/mission
objectives
– Redundancy of critical components
is assessed
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Stringent loss of crew and loss of mission
MMOD requirements have been defined
Maximum Allowable MMOD Risk Level for Each Mission Type
LOC = 1 in 1200	 LOC =1 in 2400
	 LOC = 1 in 500
LOM = 1 in 160	 LOM = 1 in 1700
System LossofCrew
PNCL LOC Risk 1-in-X
CM Backshell (AETB8) 0.99960946 0.00039054 2,561
SM Propellant Tanks 0.99997665 0.00002335 42,827
LIDS 0.99998500 0.00001500 66,667
SM HP COPY Tanks 0.99998983 0.00001017 98,284
Umbilical 0.99999636 0.00000364 274,618
CM COCking Hatch (AFRSI) 0.99999682 0.00000318 314,021
SM Mncs/ECLSS 0.99999732 0.00000268 372,544
CM Other Thermal Barriers 0.99999764 0.00000236 423,105
CM Windows 0.99999767 0.00000233 429,014
Heatshield 0.99999836 0.00000164 609,417
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BumperII combines model inputs with
environments to determine risks
Spacecraft Configuration (I-DEAS)
I-DEAS Finite Element Model
• Describes spatial relationships of spacecraft components
• Defines spacecraft orientation (velocity and zenith directions
• Defines MM/OD shield regions
Meteoroid & Debris Environments (GEOMETRY)
• Threat directions
• Velocity distribution 	 „^
• Shadowing	 iT;•	 f
Critical Particle Diameter Calculation (RESPONSE)
• Protection capability
7
Orion BumperII surface model addresses
over 500 shield configurations
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ORDEM/MEM environments are combined
with Orion attitudes and trajectories
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Testing and analysis are performed to
identify and refine failure mechanisms
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• Orion test facilities include:
• UDRI with maximum velocities of ~10 km/s
• WSTF with maximum velocities of ~8.5 km/s
• ARTI with maximum velocities of ~6.5 km/s
• To date almost 150 shots have been performed on
Orion shields
• SLA, AETB-8 tile, PICA, AVCOAT, engine nozzles,
propellant tank surrogates, radiators, composite
structures and many more material configurations
have been tested
Testing of Orion shield configurations are
used to establish the thresholds of failure
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Innovative Kevlar shields over tanks show
good performance over metallic shields
Kevlar/Foam
Kevlar shield is 2.5x better than
equal mass double-wall Al
• Initial wall breaks up projectile
• Expanded projectile is caught
by Kevlar fabric
• Low-density foam allows room
for Kevlar to absorb energy
• Very low impulse over large
area leaves shielded
component relatively unaffected
• Intermediate Nextel and Kevlar
fabric layers are added, and the
number of Kevlar layers are
adjusted, based on mission risk
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Through design and advanced shields
Orion meets safety requirements
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Analysis
ISS	 1208	 160
Lunar Sortie	 2822	 1685
Lunar Outpost	 536	 259
13	 = ..
Orion will provide safe crew access to
LEO and will support a flexible path for
manned exploration beyond
• Orion MMOD design is robust and will meet stringent
requirements for crew safety and mission success
• Orion MMOD protection is tailored for the mission type
– Meets protection requirements for high MMOD risk
missions while keeping vehicle mass on low MMOD risk
missions in line with the level of risk
• Institutes late TPS inspection with the higher risk ISS
missions to improve crew safety while minimizing the
vehicle mass
• Forward work is planned to continue impact testing and
vehicle analysis to optimize and verify Orion MMOD
protection
Unprecedented MMOD Design Influence
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